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Article
The social media performance of most political actors on 
social media platforms cannot be called a success story. In 
interviews, they glorify the interactive potential of these plat-
forms and promise to exploit it intensively in the near future 
(Brändli & Wassmer, 2014; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013), yet that 
is mostly what can be called cyber-rhetoric (Jungherr, 2016; 
Kreiss, 2011; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Instead, political actors 
use these Web 2.0 platforms to disseminate information in a 
Web 1.0 style, in what has been labeled a “Web 1.5” way of 
using these platforms (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009).
However, this definition of “exploiting the potential of 
social media” may be too narrow. Previous empirical studies 
have shown that political actors may benefit from social 
media communication in other ways. Their posts might set 
the agenda of traditional media and thus improve visibility 
(Parmelee, 2014); their performance can attract new party 
members, substituting for the general decline in party mem-
bership (Gibson, Greffet, & Cantijoch, 2016); and the low-
ered transaction costs on these platforms might facilitate 
micro-donations through which political actors can raise mil-
lions (Margetts, John, Hale, & Yasseri, 2016). Through the 
lens of network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), we 
argue that the premise for all these beneficial outcomes is a 
large digital followership (e.g., fans or followers) that 
actively reacts to politicians’ public messages (e.g., likes or 
retweets) and thus enables messages to spread through the 
network. Hence, the success of political actors’ communica-
tion on social media should be defined as their ability to 
build a large digital followership and trigger as many reac-
tions from their followers as possible.
But political actors do not enter digital ground on equal 
footing. Drawing on previous research, we assume that their 
social media success can be predicted by a set of personal 
(age, gender, education, party affiliation, ideology, parlia-
mentary activity, and urbanization of his or her constituency), 
structural (incumbency, key position, vote percentage, media 
coverage, and financial resources), and social media (adop-
tion date and activity) characteristics. Our main research 
question analyzes which characteristics of Swiss parliamen-
tarians lead to success on Facebook and Twitter in terms of 
followership and reactions. We use path analysis to examine a 
unique data set of the social media communication of Swiss 
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parliamentarians between 5 December 2011 and 15 March 
2015 and their personal, structural, and social media 
characteristics.
We start our article with discussing what political actors’ 
success on social media means from the perspective of net-
work media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015) and why 
political actors benefit from a larger digital followership 
which actively reacts to their social media contributions. 
After identifying possible impediments to their success on 
these platforms, we describe the special case of Switzerland, 
our data set, and the methods. Then we present our results for 
the two platforms, Facebook and Twitter. Finally, we put our 
findings in a broader context and discuss implications for 
future studies focusing on politicians’ success on social 
media.
Political Actors’ Success on Social 
Media
In research on politicians’ performance on social media, 
scholars have focused on the discursive potential of social 
networks, that is, the hope that political actors use social 
media to debate with citizens (Coleman & Blumler, 2009). 
Yet, political actors mostly use social media platforms like 
they use traditional media: They disseminate their informa-
tion in a Web 1.0 style over these Web 2.0 platforms (known 
as a “Web 1.5” style of use, see Jackson & Lilleker, 2009”). 
It is not that they do not know about the potential for delib-
eration on these platforms. In interviews, they explicitly talk 
about this potential and their intention to engage in discus-
sions with citizens on these platforms (Brändli & Wassmer, 
2014; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). They integrate these remarks 
about the potential of the Internet and social media, the so-
called cyber-rhetoric (Jungherr, 2016; Kreiss, 2011; Stromer-
Galley, 2014), into their communication. Often as not, their 
usage of these platforms only has a symbolic purpose 
(Jungherr, 2016): to show they are modern and close to the 
people. Thus, political actors strategically choose to use 
these platforms in a Web 1.5 manner. Communication on 
social media platforms is still from political actors to citi-
zens, and is less interactive than it could be.
Whereas according to the mass media logic politicians’ 
messages must overcome gatekeepers to reach an audience, 
according to the network media logic politicians can directly 
disseminate their information to partisan citizens (Klinger & 
Svensson, 2015). Yet, most political actors do not have a 
large digital followership that they can directly address 
(Vaccari & Nielsen, 2013), and their messages compete with 
a vast amount of other content on these platforms for visibil-
ity. To determine which content is visible, the number of 
reactions to a post or tweet indicates their popularity (van 
Dijck & Poell, 2013). The more reactions a post receives, the 
more popular it is, and the higher are the chances that it 
reaches more of a platform’s users (Karlsen & Enjolras, 
2016). That is, a political actor’s post needs reactions such as 
likes, comments, or shares on Facebook or replies, likes, or 
retweets on Twitter to increase its visibility against compet-
ing content and to reach more than just their few fans and 
followers. Thus, network media logic asserts that political 
actors’ social media success hinges heavily on users’ 
reactions.
Yet, scholars have critically debated the impact of “likes”: 
The mere clicking on social media buttons—such as liking a 
politician on Facebook—has been dismissed in one strand of 
research as “clicktivism” and “slacktivism.” An aimless digi-
tal reaction on its own was assumed to have almost no impact 
in the real world and might even prevent subsequent action 
for the cause, thus strongly differing from “real” activism 
(Skoric, 2012). However, another strand of research 
described it as a “legitimate political act” (Halupka, 2014, p. 
130). Receiving a lot of “likes” can be part of a wider hybrid 
campaigning strategy that involves many additional commu-
nication tools (Karpf, 2010), and the “like” itself is not the 
end goal: It must be seen as part of an ongoing political pro-
cess (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). One “like” often leads to 
another—and in rare cases even to hundreds of thousands—
which can have serious political consequences (Margetts 
et al., 2016). Experiments showed that sharing a video 
increases people’s willingness to engage in offline helping 
behavior (Lane & Dal Cin, 2017) and that value alignment 
between the supporter and the cause and a strong connection 
to the organization combat slacktivism (Kristofferson, White, 
& Peloza, 2014).
We argue, furthermore, that such reactions determine 
whether communication on social media platforms is suc-
cessful in five ways (see Table 1). First, reactions on plat-
forms such as Facebook and Twitter are valuable to political 
actors because each reaction is visible to both the followers 
and their respective networks. Through these broader net-
works, political actors’ messages can reach people who do 
not follow politics attentively (Vaccari, 2016). A large num-
ber of reactions might also lead to more media coverage, thus 
increasing both their online and offline visibility (Parmelee, 
2014). Second, these reactions inform social media users 
about which of their friends on these platforms share similar 
political opinions; they might be invited to also follow cer-
tain political actors. Given the general decline in party mem-
berships (Gibson, 2015), parties greatly benefit from 
facilitating a network of possible volunteers. Thus, a large 
and active followership might serve as an alternative to tradi-
tional forms of organization through party membership. 
Third, social media platforms lower the transaction costs and 
thus facilitate micro-donations, through which political 
actors sometimes raise millions; social cues—such as the 
number of people who have already donated—influence 
whether others also donate (Margetts et al., 2016). Fourth, 
exposure to political messages on social media influences 
voting intention (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015) and political 
participation (Dimitrova, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, 
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2014). Successful communication on social media (Gibson 
& McAllister, 2014) and many reactions on Facebook 
(Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Metag, Caspar, & Szenogrady, 2017) 
can lead to a higher vote share in elections or transform into 
large-scale participation such as in the Arab Spring (Margetts 
et al., 2016). While very few mobilization attempts succeed 
on such platforms, those that do may lead to unpredictable 
and extreme outcomes due to the dynamics of sharing on 
such platforms (Margetts et al., 2016). Fifth, the future com-
munication of political actors on social media is driven by 
the amount and quality of feedback they receive (Jungherr, 
2016). There are multiple options for users to provide feed-
back: likes, comments, retweets, favorites, and so on. By 
looking at the reactions to their messages, political actors are 
able to evaluate which arguments or pictures communicate 
their position most effectively, at little to no cost.
Hence, following these observations and according to the 
network media logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), the suc-
cess of political actors’ communication on social media plat-
forms should be defined not by digital debates, but by the 
size of their followership (e.g., fans and followers) and the 
number of reactions their social media actions receive (e.g., 
likes and retweets).
Impediments to Success on Free Social 
Media Platforms
Most political actors use free social media platforms due to 
their low costs, their popularity among citizens, and the 
ability to easily integrate features into their own websites 
(Jungherr, 2016). Few are able to build their own social net-
work sites like “myBarackObama.com.” Yet, political actors 
face at least three general challenges in using these free plat-
forms compared with building their own proprietary 
platform.
First, most users did not initially join the platform to fol-
low political actors. In contrast to a social network site like 
“myBarackObama.com,” users of free platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter might agree with the opinions of cer-
tain political actors, but may not want the people in their 
network to know this. Hence, political actors need to trans-
fer their members from offline to online, and to attract new 
people with successful communication on these platforms. 
To find out how successful political actors have been in 
building a digital followership, there is a public indicator 
on most platforms such as the number of fans on Facebook 
or followers on Twitter, which may motivate additional 
users to join.
Second, there is a lack of control of these platforms com-
pared with proprietary platforms. Due to their business mod-
els, political actors depend on possibly biased information 
about a platform, for example, regarding the reach of paid 
posts. Due to stricter data sharing laws and stronger reserva-
tions concerning privacy outside the United States, it is 
almost impossible to confirm the success of micro-targeting 
attempts with data not provided by the platform itself, that is, 
with independent data on concrete voting behavior. 
Regarding the reach of unpaid social media posts, political 
actors need to adjust their way of communicating to the plat-
forms’ algorithms and selection criteria to make their post-
ings visible to as many as possible (Bene, 2016). They use 
messages in a personal tone to adapt to the platforms’ style of 
communication, to show their followership that they are 
“like you and me,” and thereby to increase the number of 
reactions to their posts (McGregor, 2018).
Third, although various platforms merge and influence 
each other, new platforms continue to be developed. Political 
actors cannot realistically engage on every platform; they 
must choose the ones that best fit the goals of their digital 
communication strategy. The user base varies by platform, so 
the communication strategy must be adapted accordingly. 
For example, about 50% of the population of Switzerland 
use Facebook, and about 17% use Twitter passively and 
about 6% actively (Latzer, Büchi, & Just, 2015). Facebook 
thus represents the Swiss population more effectively than 
Twitter, the members of which mainly belong to the political 
elite or media organizations (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). 
Politicians can most effectively reach other political actors 
and journalists via Twitter, and better address the general 
public using Facebook.
Table 1. Five Desired Outcomes of a Large and Active Digital Followership on Social Media Platforms.
Indicator Desired outcome
Visibility A large digital followership and many reactions increase an actor’s visibility, which in turn can lead to more media 
coverage.
Organization Due to the general decline in party membership, political actors might organize their followership via social media. 
Citizens are more often invited to participate in politics on social media platforms: They are being recruited as 
members, or being activated, i.e., to help out at events or attend demonstrations.
Micro-donations Social media platforms lower transaction costs and facilitate micro-donations (e.g., money, time, or ideas). Social 
cues influence whether someone donates or not.
Mobilization Mobilizing members at the right moment is crucial for political outcomes. Since mobile devices can access various 
social media platforms, people are instantly notified and possibly mobilized.
Feedback Thanks to a large and active digital followership, political actors receive feedback on their messages and can thus 
evaluate them. Future communication behavior is driven by the amount and quality of feedback.
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Normalized Use—But Also Normalized 
Success?
In addition to these challenges, political actors do not access 
social media platforms on an equal footing. Well-funded 
political actors and those with a strong presence in tradi-
tional media dominate digital political communication 
flows. Therefore, political communication continues to be 
“normalized” (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Rauchfleisch & 
Metag, 2016). Previous research on the impact of politi-
cians’ personal and structural characteristics on their online 
political communication has focused mostly on the adoption 
of (and activity on) various platforms (e.g., Larsson & 
Kalsnes, 2014). The results of this focus are mixed, and 
most of them indicate normalization. Some of the discrepan-
cies between results may be due to the use of different indi-
cators for personal and structural advantages and different 
dependent variables (Strandberg, 2008, 2013). Therefore, 
we propose a set of personal and structural characteristics to 
systemize this field of research: Personal characteristics 
such as age, gender, education, party affiliation, and parlia-
mentary activity are important predictors of platform adop-
tion and activity, but structural characteristics such as 
incumbency, key position, vote percentage, media coverage, 
and financial power are important for interpreting results in 
terms of normalization and equalization (Keller & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, in press).
Since for many political actors being active on social 
media platforms has become a necessary (although not suf-
ficient) condition for political success (van Dijck, 2013), 
they have gained knowledge about how social media plat-
forms work and how to generate digital reactions. Some of 
them have hired (external) community managers to improve 
their social media communication (Gálvez-Rodríguez, Haro-
de-Rosario, & Caba-Pérez, 2017) or are early adopters and 
thus have more experience than newcomers in how to build 
up a followership and provoke reactions. Other political 
actors may be very prolific and post several times a day, cre-
ating a stronger social media presence. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether personal or even structural characteristics 
still play such a crucial role in success on these platforms. 
For our analysis, we distinguish between personal, structural, 
and social media characteristics to find out which predict 
success (i.e., digital followership and reactions) on these 
platforms. Our research question explores: Which character-
istics of political actors lead to success on Facebook and 
Twitter?
Personal characteristics predict the use of social media 
platforms very well in the Swiss population (NET-Metrix, 
2014). Younger members of the Swiss Parliament from urban 
regions are more likely to have adopted Twitter early and to 
actively tweet on the microblogging service (Rauchfleisch & 
Metag, 2016). Because users of these platforms probably feel 
better represented by members of parliament who are of a 
similar age and engage in similar social media behavior, we 
expect that younger members of parliament from urban 
regions attract a larger followership. In addition, we assume 
that politicians who actively submit parliamentary proposals 
win more fans and followers on these platforms since they 
can report on their parliamentary efforts, which might help 
explain why many users follow politicians on these plat-
forms. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: a) Younger members of parliament who b) actively 
submit parliamentary proposals and c) represent urban 
regions attract a larger digital followership on Facebook 
and Twitter.
Although political actors disseminate information in a 
Web 1.0 style, most have a steadily rising number of digital 
fans (Klinger, 2013). The distribution of followers among 
politicians is usually heavily skewed; for example, while few 
politicians in the U.S. midterm elections had more than 
100,000 followers, most of them only had a few 1000 
(Vaccari & Nielsen, 2013, p. 209). We assume that political 
actors with structural advantages such as incumbency, vote 
percentage, key position, media coverage, and financial 
resources have more fans on social media platforms than 
structurally disadvantaged ones, since these advantages may 
lead to greater popularity, professional support, and to more 
statements they can recycle on their page. We assume that 
structural characteristics explain in a normalized fashion 
why some political actors have built a larger digital follower-
ship than others.
H2: Structurally advantaged political actors have a larger 
digital followership on Facebook and Twitter than struc-
turally disadvantaged ones.
Building a large followership does not on its own reflect 
how successfully political actors perform on the platform. 
Politicians depend on reactions such as likes or retweets, 
which enable their public messages and tweets to spread 
through the network, to compete against the vast number of 
other public messages and extend their visibility beyond 
their followership. While personal and structural characteris-
tics should influence who attracts more fans and followers, it 
seems less likely that they have a strong impact on the suc-
cess of individual posts and tweets. For example, whereas a 
politician’s age or key position might influence the one-time 
decision of a citizen to “like” or “follow” her on the plat-
form, for daily decisions of which posts or tweets to like or 
retweet, social media characteristics such as adoption date 
and activity are more likely to predict the number of reac-
tions politicians receive. These two social media characteris-
tics function as indicators of politicians’ experience on these 
platforms; we expect that the more experience they have 
gained on these platforms, the more reactions they will 
receive on their Facebook posts and tweets on Twitter. That 
is, members of parliament who joined the platform early and 
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actively post public messages probably know better how to 
provoke reactions. In addition, those with a larger follower-
ship generally reach more people, which make it more likely 
that they will receive more digital reactions (Casero-Ripollés, 
Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016). Therefore, we hypothesize:
H3: Early adoption and active use lead to more reactions 
on Facebook and Twitter.
H4: The larger the digital followership of a political actor, 
the more digital reactions the actor receives, on average, 
on Facebook and Twitter.
Method
Our case study focuses on political actors in Switzerland, 
which serves as an ideal case for studying success on social 
media platforms in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) 
due to its media and political plurality (246 members of par-
liament from 11 parties in 2015, for media plurality see 
Appendix A). The country’s political system further encour-
ages permanent campaigning (Norris, 2003) and permanent 
contact between political actors and the citizenry: Swiss 
citizens are invited to participate in direct democracy at the 
ballot box multiple times a year (e.g., four times in 2016). 
Furthermore, every 4 years citizens elect the members of the 
two chambers with a list on which they can add or remove 
people from their canton; they are even allowed to put a 
name twice on a list. Hence, political actors are in constant 
competition for attention. These instruments of direct 
democracy make Switzerland a special case (Rauchfleisch 
& Metag, 2016) and might contribute to politicians’ success 
on social media as the latter need to continuously campaign 
and citizens need to continuously keep informed as part of 
their civic duty. In countries with other political systems—
less permanent campaigning and fewer instruments of direct 
democracy—politicians might have more difficulties in 
winning a large followership, which reacts to their social 
media postings.
Politicians also differ starkly in their personal and struc-
tural characteristics. Since Switzerland’s parliamentarians are 
not full-time professional politicians, permanent campaign-
ing needs an easy-to-handle and not resource-intensive solu-
tion to connect to the public. Therefore, social media platforms 
are very appealing to them. A survey of Swiss political actors 
showed that Facebook and Twitter are of growing importance 
(Brändli & Wassmer, 2014), for example, political actors’ 
adoption rates of Twitter steadily rose from 2.5% in 2009 to 
13.5% in 2011 to 34% in 2013 (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016, 
p. 2422). In our data collection of 2015, 108 (44%) of the 246 
members of Swiss parliament used Twitter and 63 parliamen-
tarians (26%) used Facebook pages.
Data were collected for all members of the Swiss 
Parliament using R (R Development Core Team, 2017) and 
the packages “Rfacebook” (Barbera, Piccirilli, Geisler, & 
van Atteveldt, 2016), and “twitteR” (Gentry, 2015). All 
pages, posts, and counts of reactions were automatically 
downloaded from the beginning of the 49th legislation period 
(5 December 2011) on 15 March 2015: This included 63 par-
liamentarians’ Facebook pages with 14,264 posts and 108 
Twitter accounts with 54,385 posts. This timeframe allowed 
us to analyze how political actors in Switzerland used social 
media platforms to build a digital followership that actively 
spreads their messages during a non-election period. Despite 
the growing importance of permanent campaigning (Norris, 
2003), these periods between elections have mostly been 
neglected in research (Vaccari, 2016). There are two depen-
dent variables: Digital followership is the count of fans on 
Facebook and followers on Twitter as of 15 March 2015. 
Digital reactions is the average of the sum of likes, com-
ments, and shares on Facebook and of favorites and retweets 
on Twitter for the study period. The replies on a tweet could 
not be retrieved via twitteR.
Similar to Larsson and Kalsnes (2014), in our study, we 
differentiated between politicians’ personal and structural 
characteristics, but also added social media characteristics 
and important predictors identified in other studies (such as 
education). The personal characteristics age, gender, educa-
tion, and party affiliation were drawn from the official web-
site of the Swiss Parliament (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2015; 
Parlamentsdienste, 2015). The ideology of political actors is 
ranked on a scale from −10.0 (left) to +10.0 (right) based on 
Schoenenberger (2014). A ranking of parliamentary activity 
for each political actor was retrieved from Parlamentsdienste 
(2015) and the degree of urbanization of their constituency 
from BADAC (2001).
The variables for the structural advantages incumbency, 
key positions, and vote percentage were collected via the 
official website of the Swiss Parliament (Bundesamt für 
Statistik, 2015; Parlamentsdienste, 2015). Media coverage is 
based on a search for each member of parliament in 54 print, 
37 online, and 16 television news outlets and three news 
agencies covering all three national languages during the 
49th legislation using the online archives of the media outlets 
(see Appendix A). Financial resources corresponded to the 
number of paid ads in 65 news outlets adapted from a study 
by Bühlmann, Gerber, Salathe, and Zumbach (2015). The 
two platform-specific variables are adoption, which repre-
sents the number of days since the account was created and 
the first post was published, and activity, which describes the 
number of posts per day during the legislative period.
We first report descriptive results to allow readers to form 
an impression of the success of Swiss politicians’ social 
media communication. We then conduct a path analysis 
based on negative binomial and multiple linear regression 
analysis (for additional information, see Appendix B) to find 
out which characteristics lead to a larger digital followership 
and more digital reactions in line with our proposed hypoth-
eses. We also conducted regression analysis for each type of 
reaction (likes, retweets, etc.) separately as a robustness 
check (Appendix C).
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Results
In Switzerland, the success of politicians’ performance on 
social media is mostly an outlier phenomenon (see Figures 1 
and 2). Almost every party has a few politicians who attract 
many times the number of fans or reactions compared with 
others.
The 63 Facebook accounts analyzed have an average 
digital followership of 2,106 (SD = 529, median = 286). 
Oskar Freysinger of the right-leaning Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) acquired the most fans on Facebook (24,466), fol-
lowed by his colleague from the same party, Natalie Rickli, 
who had 17,596. Lukas Reimann (8,178) and party leader 
Toni Brunner (6,613), both SVP, also curate popular 
Facebook sites. Among the exceptional performers are not 
only political actors from the largest right-leaning party: 
Cédric Wermuth of the left-leaning party, Social Democratic 
Party of Switzerland (SP; 9,359) and the leader of the cen-
trist party, Christian Democratic People’s Party of 
Switzerland (CVP), Filippo Lombardi (6,700) also reach 
many citizens.
Although Twitter is a niche social media platform in 
Switzerland, the average followership of the 108 political 
actors who use this platform is even higher than on Facebook 
with 2,533 followers (SD = 488, median = 345), which illus-
trates the importance of Twitter in political communication 
in Switzerland. Whereas right-leaning accounts dominate on 
Facebook, in the Twittersphere political actors from the left 
have a larger digital followership: Cédric Wermuth (SP) had 
the most with 25,105 followers, followed by SP Party leader 
Christian Levrat (12,650), Balthasar Glättli (10,768, Green 
Party), Jacqueline Badran (8,937, SP), Bastien Girod (8,589, 
Green Party), and Pascale Bruderer (8,581, SP). Of the 
right-leaning parties, Natalie Rickli (13,625, SVP) and 
Christoph Mörgeli (9,270, SVP) have built up large follow-
erships on Twitter.
A Facebook post receives on average 38.2 likes, com-
ments, and shares (SD = 12, median = 8.1). Again, Oskar 
Freysinger (672.7, SVP) leads the chart, followed by Natalie 
Rickli (328.9, SVP) and Lukas Reimann (128.1, SVP). In 
this SVP-dominated platform, Guillaume Barrazone of the 
centrist party CVP (123.2) is a noteworthy exception.
Four political actors receive the most reactions per tweet: 
Daniel Vischer (14.7, Green), Kathrin Bertschy (14.5, Green 
Liberal), Pirmin Bischof (14.4, CVP), and Oskar Freysinger 
(14.3, SVP). Following by quite a distance with around 
seven reactions per tweet are Christoph Mörgeli (7.3, SVP), 
Alfred Heer, (7.2, SVP), and Pascale Bruderer (7.2, SP). 
Political actors receive on average 2.3 reactions per tweet 
(SD = 2.8, median = 1.5).
We conducted path analysis based on negative binomial 
(for the number of followers) and multiple linear regression 
(for the average number of reactions) analysis to determine 
which personal, structural, and social media characteristics 
explain the success in terms of digital followership and digi-
tal reactions.
Seven characteristics predict the size of the followership 
on Facebook (see Figure 3): Younger politicians did not win 
more followers on Twitter (Exp(B) = 0.990, SE = 0.019, 
p = .574, rejects H1a). Yet, supporting H1b and H1c, politi-
cians from more urban regions have 1.3% more fans 
(Exp(B) = 1.013, SE = 0.007, p = .074), and each parliamen-
tary submission increases the size of the followership by 
1.6% (Exp(B) = 1.016, SE = 0.006, p = .012). In addition, 
Figure 1. The size of followership on Facebook and Twitter of 
Swiss members of parliament.
Every dot represents a member of parliament, grouped by party affiliation. 
Followership indicates the number of fans on Facebook and followers on 
Twitter.
Figure 2. Average number of reactions that Swiss members 
of parliament receive on their Facebook posts and tweets on 
Twitter.
Every dot represents a member of parliament, grouped by party affiliation. 
The number of reactions is the average of likes, comments, and shares 
per post on Facebook and favorites and retweets per tweet on Twitter.
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male politicians win more fans (Exp(B) = 0.444, SE = 0.326, 
p = .013).
Of the structural characteristics, a one-unit increase in 
vote share raises the number of fans by 2.2% (Exp(B) = 1.022, 
SE = 0.12, p = .073) and each presence in a news article leads 
to an increase of 0.1% (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = 0.000, p < .001; 
supports H2 on Facebook). Yet, an increase in financial 
resources leads to a decrease in the followership by a factor 
of 0.98 (Exp(B) = 0.977, SE = 0.011, p = .028) diminishing 
support for H2 on Facebook. Of the social media character-
istics, only activity explains the size of the followership: 
Those who increase their posting activity on average by one 
post per day raise the expected number of fans by an extraor-
dinary 306.6% (Exp(B) = 3.066, SE = 0.506, p = .027), sup-
ports H3 on Facebook.
In turn, digital reactions correlate the strongest with the 
number of digital fans (b = .984, SEM = 0.001, p = .000; 
Model 2: R2 = .892, adjusted R2 = .858; support for H4 on 
Facebook). Whereas a strong media presence leads to more 
fans, it hinders the average number of digital reactions 
(b = −.135, SEM = 0.13, p = .072). Other structural character-
istics do not appear to influence the number of reactions on 
Facebook. Of the personal characteristics, higher education 
leads to more digital reactions, on average (b = .11, 
SEM = 11.16, p = .067). In contrast to our expectations, none 
of the social media activity characteristics affects the number 
of reactions on Facebook (rejects H3 for Facebook). The 
reduced model (only significant variables included in the 
path model) does not change R2 significantly (change in 
R2 = .020, p = .718).
On Twitter, six characteristics predict the number of fol-
lowers (see Figure 4): Younger politicians (Exp(B) = 0.962, 
SE = 0.010, p < .001), left-leaning politicians (Exp(B) = .953, 
SE = 0.016, p = .003), those who actively submit parliamentary 
proposals (Exp(B) = 1.007, SE = 0.004, p = .053), and those 
representing an urban region (Exp(B) = 1.011, SE = 0.004, 
p = .007) won more followers (supports H1a, H1b, and H1c). 
In addition, each mention in a news article increases the num-
ber of followers by 0.1% (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = 0.000, p < .001, 
support for H2 on Twitter). Finally, for each day earlier that a 
politician adopted Twitter, there is a 0.1% increase in the his or 
her followership (Exp(B) = 1.001, SE = 0.000, p < .001).
Personal, structural, and social media experience vari-
ables have little impact on the average number of digital 
reactions (Model 4: R2 = .269, adjusted R2 = .150). Users are 
more likely to react to politicians who are structurally disad-
vantaged in terms of key positions (b = −.209, SEM = 0.237, 
p = .043) and a low vote share (b = −.202, SEM = 0.018, 
p = .062), but who receive a lot of media coverage (b = .470, 
SEM = 0.001, p = .001). Contrary to expectations, late adopt-
ers are favored with more reactions (b = −.278, SEM = 0.001, 
p = .011, rejects H3 on Twitter). More followers also do not 
lead to more digital reactions on Twitter (rejects H4 on 
Twitter). As for the reduced Twitter model, R2 does not 
change significantly when only the significant variables 
were included (change in R2 = .057, p = .501).
Discussion
This study contributed with a unique data set of personal, 
structural, and social media characteristics of the members of 
the Swiss Parliament to enhance understanding of politi-
cians’ varying degrees of success on social media platforms. 
We argue that political actors’ social media success should be 
evaluated not (only) based on their interactions and political 
debates with citizens, but on the size and activity of their 
digital followership—which potentially lead to greater visi-
bility, low-effort organization and low-threshold recruitment, 
Figure 3. Path analysis of Swiss politicians’ characteristics 
predicting success on Facebook.
Negative binomial regression for DV Followership: Only significant odds 
ratios are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV Reactions (adjusted 
R2 = .858): Only significant standardized beta coefficients are displayed.
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .1, N = 63.
Figure 4. Path analysis of Swiss politicians’ characteristics 
predicting success on Twitter.
Negative binomial regression for DV Followership: Only significant odds 
ratios are displayed. Linear regression analyses for DV Reactions (adjusted 
R2 = .150): Only significant standardized beta coefficients are displayed.
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .1, N = 108.
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more micro-donations, better-timed mobilization and illumi-
nating feedback for future communication strategies, and to 
potentially large-scale social movements.
Three personal characteristics increased politicians’ 
chances of attracting a larger digital followership. Confirming 
our first hypothesis, younger politicians who actively submit 
parliamentary proposals are more popular on social media 
platforms, presumably because users expect politicians to be 
engaged, and active politicians are more interesting to fol-
low. Furthermore, those who represent citizens from an 
urban region also become popular on these platforms. We 
assume that this is due to the sociodemographic characteris-
tics of the user base of these platforms: Members of parlia-
ment who resemble the users of a platform (younger, urban) 
might find it easier to enlarge their network. Future studies 
should investigate the fit between the sociodemographics of 
a platform’s users and the politicians seeking to attract them, 
how the content of more and less active politicians differs, 
and the expectations of citizens who follow politicians on 
social media.
On both platforms under investigation, Facebook and 
Twitter, the structural advantage of high levels of media cov-
erage best predicts social media success (H2 confirmed). 
First, citizens “like” and “follow” political actors who are 
often covered by traditional media. Second, media coverage 
is key for digital reactions on both platforms—but in differ-
ent ways. Media coverage directly leads to more digital reac-
tions on Twitter. On Facebook, the impact of media coverage 
is less clear-cut: Although it appears to indirectly increase 
reactions via the digital followership, its direct impact is 
negative, leading to fewer reactions. We assume that people 
“like” political actors who are often covered by traditional 
media, but react less frequently when they are often visible in 
traditional media, maybe because the social media message 
only repeats the message already heard via traditional media, 
or because people think the respective politician does not 
need help spreading his or her messages on social media. By 
contrast, political actors on Twitter receive a lot of digital 
reactions when they dominate traditional media coverage. 
Again, this can be explained by the news-like character and 
the motivation of users to receive news and live events 
(Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012).
In addition to media coverage, one other structural advan-
tage indicates a normalization on Facebook: Politicians with 
a larger vote share attract more fans on Facebook. They do 
well to build a large digital followership that actively reacts 
to their posts and can be mobilized during the next election 
or vote.
Yet, contradicting our second hypothesis, we also found 
indications of equalization on both platforms: Politicians 
who spend less money on ads in traditional media have larger 
digital followerships on Facebook. We assume that they do 
not need to pay for as many ads in print media as those with 
fewer digital fans because they have already built large fol-
lowerships. That is, they manage to reach thousands 
of people without paying for traditional ads. Hence, future 
studies should dig deeper and analyze whether these politi-
cians use Facebook ads to raise their visibility: They may 
simply have shifted from paying for traditional to digital ads.
Although we did not find any direct effects of social media 
characteristics on reactions (H3 rejected), on both platforms 
neither early adaption nor intensive activity led to more reac-
tions. However, there is an indirect effect (H4 confirmed). On 
Twitter, it is not the greater social media experience and sav-
viness of early adaptors that assures more reactions, but the 
greater professional follower networks they were able to 
build in the early years of Twitter (whereas latecomers have 
more problems to get noticed), which then leads to more reac-
tions per tweet. By contrast on Facebook, activity leads to 
more fans and thus to more reactions. At this point, it becomes 
clear that the different technical affordances of both platforms 
(Bucher & Helmond, 2017) may have had an impact on our 
results, as the two platforms differ strongly in their algo-
rithms. It may be that continuous activity is rewarded by the 
Facebook algorithm, assuring the visibility of posts and thus 
making reactions more likely. Thus, although an active digital 
followership can spread a message to raise visibility, the 
effective reach of a message is still moderated by the algo-
rithm. In particular, how far each message spreads in the net-
works of their friends and followers depends on the algorithm 
(or on the money politicians spend on “sponsored posts”). 
Thus, platforms with a strong algorithmic influence— such as 
Facebook—are powerful actors.
The results of the Swiss political actors’ behavior on these 
platforms illustrate how the platform moderates their suc-
cess: The gap between politicians receiving the most and the 
least reactions, on average, by their followership is much 
larger on Facebook (Oskar Freysinger with 672 and Peter 
Keller with 0.41) than on Twitter (Daniel Vischer with 14.67 
and Heinz Brand with <0.01). Since there are more Swiss 
Facebook than Twitter users, not only do the “rich get richer” 
in terms of “likes” on Facebook, they reach an even larger 
secondary audience on Facebook through “likes” than they 
probably would have on Twitter. Therefore, investigating 
success on social media needs not only to focus further on 
the active digital followership, but also on the moderating 
role of platforms’ algorithms.
This study has several limitations. The proposed model 
suggests that offline measures (e.g., vote shares) predict suc-
cess online (e.g., followership) by measuring correlations. 
That leaves the question of causality unanswered. Future stud-
ies should address the interplay between offline and online 
success: Does social media communication lead to success 
offline, which in turn leads to success online again? Although 
the investigation was a single country study on Switzerland, 
our results are supported by findings from other countries: For 
example, van Aelst, van Erkel, D’heer and Harder (2016) 
found for politicians in Belgium a similar relationship between 
the size of the Twitter and the media coverage they receive. 
Contrary to our results, however, the amount of followers also 
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explains the digital reactions, probably due to their focus on 
the election phase. In Norway, the leaders of the three largest 
parties received by far the most reactions on Facebook 
(Larsson, 2016), indicating a normalization tendency that we 
also found for Facebook in Switzerland. Yet, Samuel-Azran, 
Yarchi, and Wolfsfeld (2015) who compared challengers with 
incumbent political leaders from Israel found equally large 
followerships on Facebook indicating equalization opportuni-
ties. In sum, the country-specific aspects of the political sys-
tem and the adoption and use of social media must be a central 
element of comparing political actors’ social media success in 
different countries: While the possible beneficial outcomes of 
social media might be similar, the platforms’ roles in a country 
might not be.
Furthermore, we argued that the power to determine suc-
cess on social media has shifted toward citizens. Political 
actors’ impact on social media depends heavily on their fol-
lowership, which reacts to (and spreads) their messages. 
However, the feedback might not always be favorable: 
Digital citizens—and especially media actors—watch with 
Argus eyes what political actors post, which could spark a 
firestorm. That is one reason why political actors cautiously 
post messages and very seldom deliberate publicly online 
(Kalsnes, 2016; Stromer-Galley, 2000). Although Swiss 
political actors are usually very careful online, and none of 
the most successful politicians in this study was involved in 
a firestorm that could have biased these results, we did not 
distinguish between positive and negative digital reactions.
Finally, “likes” might be manipulated by users or bots. 
Since “manipulations” are an established part of offline 
political communication (e.g., orchestrated audiences or lob-
byists), it is not surprising that they happen online as well. 
However, they need to be kept in mind and should be further 
investigated (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, & Sele, 2016). In addi-
tion, political actors might outsource their followership man-
agement and may not (regularly) monitor their online 
presence themselves. Yet, it is ultimately the politicians’ 
characteristics that attract a large digital followership and 
reactions.
We argued that building an active digital followership 
might become a crucial part of a successful political career. 
In Switzerland, almost half of the successful outlier cases are 
younger political actors from both sides of the political spec-
trum and larger as well as smaller parties. How large and 
active their digital followership becomes might serve as a 
predictor of their future political success.
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